Genetic Privacy by Gostin, Lawrence O.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1995 
Genetic Privacy 
Lawrence O. Gostin 
Georgetown University Law Center, gostin@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/751 
 
23 J.L. Med. & Ethics 320-330 (1995) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Health Policy Commons 
Genetic Privacy
Lawrence 0. Gostin
uman genomic information is invested with enor-
mous power in a scientifically motivated society.
Genomic information has the capacity to pro
duce a great deal of good for society. It can help identify
and understand the etiology and pathophysiology of dis-
ease. In so doing, medicine and science can expand the
ability to prevent and ameliorate human malady through
genetic testing, treatment, and reproductive counseling.
Genomic information can just as powerfully serve less
beneficent ends. Information can be used to discover deeply
personal attributes of an individual's life. That informa-
tion can be used to invade a person's private sphere, to
alter a person's sense of self- and family identity, and to
affect adversely opportunities in education, employment,
and insurance.1 Genomic information can also affect fami-
lies and ethnic groups that share genetic similarities.
It is sometimes assumed that significant levels of pri-
vacy can coexist with widespread collection of genomic
information. Understandably, we want to advance all valid
interests-both collective and individual. We want to be-
lieve that we can continue to acquire and use voluminous
data from the human genome while also protecting indi-
vidual, family, and group privacy. This article demonstrates
that no such easy resolution of the conflict between the
need for genomic information and the need for privacy
exists. Because absolute privacy cannot realistically be
achieved while collecting genetic data, we confront a hard
choice: Should we sharply limit the systematic collection
of genomic information to achieve reasonable levels of pri-
vacy? Or, is the value of genomic information so impor-
tant to the achievement of societal aspirations for health
that the law ought not promise absolute or even significant
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levels of privacy, but rather that data be collected and used
in orderly and just ways, consistent with the values of indi-
viduals and communities? As I argue, the law at present
neither adequately protects privacy nor ensures fair infor-
mation practices. Moreover, the substantial variability in
the law probably impedes the development of an effective
genetic information system.
In earlier articles, I scrutinized the meaning and bound-
aries of health information privacy.2 Here, I build on that
work by examining a particular aspect of health informa-
tion-genetic privacy. I acknowledge a debt to those schol-
ars who have aptly identified and wrestled with the diffi-
cult ethical and legal issues inherent in genomic informa-
tion.3 This is well-tread territory; what I hope to bring to
the literature is a conceptual structure relating to the ac-
quisition and use of genomic information. First, the
methods of collection and use of genomic data must be
understood and its public purposes evaluated. Second, the
privacy implications of genomic information must be mea-
sured. To what extent are genomic data the same as, or
different from, other health information? Third, an exami-
nation of the current constitutional and statutory law must
be undertaken to determine whether existing safeguards
are adequate to protect the privacy and security of genomic
data. Finally, proposals for balancing societal needs for
genomic information and claims for privacy by individuals
and families must be generated.
Genetic information infrastructure
I define the genetic information infrastructure as the basic,
underlying framework of collection, storage, use, and trans-
mission of genomic information (including human tissue
and extracted DNA) to support all essential functions in
genetic research, diagnosis, treatment, and reproductive
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counseling. Despite the technical problems and the cost,
several governmental4 and private' committees have pro-
posed automation of health data, including genomic infor-
mation. Several conceptual and technological innovations
are likely to accelerate the automation of health records:
patient-based longitudinal clinical records, which include
genetic testing and screening information; unique identifi-
ers and the potential to link genomic information to iden-
tifiable persons; and genetic data bases for clinical, research,
and public health purposes.
Longitudinal clinical records: testing and screening
The health care system is moving toward patient-based
longitudinal health records. These records, held in elec-
tronic form, contain all data relevant to the individual's
health collected over a lifetime. What is foreseen is a single
record for every person in the United States, continually
expanded from prebirth to death, and accessible to a wide
range of individuals and institutions.6
Genetic testing and screening are likely to become an
important part of longitudinal clinical records. The princi-
pal forms include: fetal (prenatal), newborn, carrier, and
clinical (primary care) screening.7 Prenatal screening seeks
to identify disease in the fetus. Prenatal diagnosis of birth
defects often involves genetic analysis of amniotic fluid,
blood, or other tissues. Prenatal diagnostic methods are
used for genetic diseases including Down syndrome, Tay-
Sachs, sickle cell, and thalassemia major (Cooley's ane-
mia). Newborn screening often focuses on detection of
inborn errors of metabolism. Phenylketonuria (PKU) was
the first condition subject to newborn screening; other in-
born defects often screened at birth are galactosemia,
branched-chain ketonuria, and homocystinuria.' Carrier
screening seeks to identify heterozygotes for genes for re-
cessive disease. Carrier testing has been used for such con-
ditions as Tay-Sachs, cystic fibrosis (CF), and sickle cell.
The Human Genome Initiative has advanced to the
point where it is now possible to conceive of an ever-ex-
panding ability to detect genetic causes of diseases in indi-
viduals and populations. Testing for predispositions to dis-
ease represents one of the most important developments.
For example, testing for predispositions to Huntington's
disease, colon cancer, heart disease, and Alzheimer's dis-
ease are currently possible or expected.9 Relatively recent
discoveries include genes found for ataxia-telangiectasia (a
rare hereditary neurological disorder of childhood),'0 Lowe
syndrome (a rare X-linked disorder affecting diverse organ
systems)," melanoma, pancreatic cancer, 2 and breast can-
cer.3 Genetic methods to identify elevated risk for multi-
factorial diseases are also likely. It may be possible, for
example, to identify individuals at risk for such conditions
as schizophrenia, manic depression, and alcohol or drug
dependency.
Clinical records could potentially be linked to many
other sources of genomic information: (i) a lucrative com-
mercial market in self-testing, which is growing even be-
fore scientists regard test-kits as reliable (for example, test-
ing for genetic predictors of breast cancer); 14 (ii) workplace
screening, through which employers can determine an
employee's current and future capacity to perform a job or
to burden pension or health care benefit plans 5 (such test-
ing may occur despite some legal restrictions under dis-
ability discrimination statutes'); (iii) screening to deter-
mine eligibility for health, life, and disability insurance,
which is likely when tests are more cost-effective; 17 (iv)
testing in the criminal justice system, which will increase
as more courts recognize the probative value of genomic
data;"8 and (v) testing for a wide variety of public purposes
(for instance, to prevent fraud in collection of welfare or
other social benefits, to identify family ties in adoption,
and to adjudicate paternity suits)." Automated health in-
formation systems hold the capacity electronically to link
information collected for these and other purposes. Data
from several sources can be compared and matched; and
different configurations of data can reveal new understand-
ings about the individual.
It is thus possible to conceive of a genetic information
system that contains a robust account of the past, present,
and future health of each individual, ranging from genetic
fetal abnormalities and neonate carrier states, to current
and future genetic conditions at different points in one's
life. Genetic data can even explain causes of morbidity and
mortality after death; for example, genetic technologies
were used to determine whether Abraham Lincoln had
Marfan's disease. 20 As will become apparent below, such
genetic explanations of morbidity and mortality provide
an expansive understanding of the attributes not only of
the individual, but also of her family (ancestors as well as
current and future generations) and possibly of whole popu-
lations.
Unique identifiers and potential links
to identifiable persons
Health data can be collected and stored in identifiable or
nonidentifiable forms. Data raise different levels of pri-
vacy concerns, depending on whether they can be linked
to a specific person. The most serious privacy concerns are
raised where genomic data are directly linked to a known
individual. For reasons of efficiency, many health plans in
the private and public sector are considering the use of
unique identifiers. These identifiers would be used for a
variety of health, administrative, financial, statistical, and
research purposes. The identifier would facilitate access to
care and reimbursement for services rendered. Some en-
visage using the social security number (SSN) as the unique
identifier, which is controversial because the SSN is linked
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to data from the Internal Revenue Service, Department of
Defense, debt collectors, the Medical Information Bureau,
credit care companies, and so forth.
Where data are collected, or held in nonidentifiable
form, they pose few problems of privacy. Because anony-
mous data are not personally linked, they cannot reveal
intimate information that affect individual privacy rights.
Epidemiological data, including health statistics, are fre-
quently collected in this form. This enables investigators
or public health personnel to collect a great deal of infor-
mation, usually without measurable burdens on privacy
interests. The obvious question arises whether genomic data
can also be collected in nonidentifiable form. Genomic data
that are not linked to identified individuals can significantly
reduce, but do not eliminate, privacy concerns. Genomic
data are qualitatively different from other health data be-
cause they are inherently linked to one person. While non-
genetic descriptions of any given patient's disease and treat-
ment could apply to many other individuals, genomic data
are unique. But, although the ability to identify a named
individual in a large population simply from genetic mate-
rial is unlikely, the capacity of computers to search mul-
tiple data bases provides a potential for linking genomic
information to that person. It follows that nonlinked ge-
nomic data do not assure anonymity and that privacy and
security safeguards must attach to any form of genetic ma-
terial. It is, therefore, a concern that even the strict genetic
privacy statutes that have been introduced in Congress
exempt "personal genetic records maintained anonymously
for research purposes only."21 Minimally, such statutes must
require that privacy and security arrangements ensure that
these "anonymous" data are never linked to identified per-
sons.
Genetic data bases
Data bases collect, store, use, and transfer vast amounts of
health information, often in electronic or automated form.
The technology exists to transfer data among data bases,
to match and reconfigure information, and to seek identi-
fying characteristics of individuals and populations. Data
bases hold information on numerous subjects including
medical cost reimbursements, hospital discharges, health
status, research, and specific diseases.' A growing number
of data bases also contain genetic information. 23 Genetic
research usually requires only DNA, sources of which in-
clude not only solid tissues, but also blood, saliva, and any
other nucleated cells.24 Reilly defines DNA banking as "the
long-term storage of cells, transformed cell lines, or ex-
tracted DNA for subsequent retrieval and analysis"; it is
"the indefinite storage of information derived from DNA
analysis, such as linkage profiles of persons at risk for
Huntington Disease or identity profiles based on analysis
with a set of probes and enzymes."25
Genetic data bases are held in both the private and
public sector for clinical, research, and public health pur-
poses. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), for ex-
ample, maintains a genetic data base for cancer research,
while private universities, such as the University of Utah
human tissue repository, conduct genetic research. Com-
mercial companies offer genetic banking as a service to re-
searchers or individuals.26 Genetic data bases are also cre-
ated to support nonhealth-related functions, such as iden-
tification of the remains of soldiers,27 detection, prosecu-
tion, and post-conviction supervision through "DNA fin-
gerprinting" of persons engaging in criminal conduct,28 and
identification of blood lines in paternity and child disputes. 2
9
One problematic source of information is previously
stored tissue samples. Stored samples may be regarded as
inchoate data bases because the technology exists to ex-
tract from them considerable current and future health
data. 0 The public health and research communities have
shown increasing interest in using existing tissue samples
for genetic testing and for creating new genetic data bases.
From a privacy perspective, this interest raises a serious
problem: any consent that was obtained when that tissue
was originally extracted would not meet current informed
consent standards because the donor could not have envis-
aged future genetic applications.
The most prominent example of an inchoate genetic
data base is the Guthrie spot program, whereby dried blood
spots are taken from virtually all newborns throughout the
United States. All states screen newborns for PKU, con-
genital hyperthyroidism, and other genetic defects. The ge-
netic composition of Guthrie spots remains stable for many
years and, if frozen, can be held indefinitely. A recent sur-
vey found that three-quarters of the states store their Guthrie
cards, with thirteen storing them for more than five years.
Of them, several store these cards indefinitely; and a num-
ber of other states have expressed an intention to do so.3
Only two require parental consent for the blood spot.
Perhaps the most ambitious public or private effort to
create a data base with both genetic and nongenetic appli-
cations is the National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (NHANES) conducted by several federal agencies. 2
NHANES has collected comprehensive health status data
in patient-identifiable form on some 40,000 Americans in
eighty-one counties in twenty-six states. About 500 pieces
of data are collected from each subject, ranging from socio-
demographics, diet, bone density, and blood pressure, to
risk status, drug use, and sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs). Additionally, NHANES tests and stores biological
samples for long-term follow-up and statistical research.
NHANES provides a classic illustration of a massive
collection of highly personal and sensitive information that
has enduring societal importance. These data pose a sig-
nificant risk of privacy invasion, but they are critical to
understanding health problems in the population.
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Clinical and public health benefits of
genomic information
Americans seem enamored with the power of genomic in-
formation. It is often thought capable of explaining much
that is human: personality, intelligence, appearance, be-
havior, and health.33 Genetic technologies generated from
scientific assessment are commonly believed always to be
accurate and highly predictive. These beliefs are highly
exaggerated; for instance, personal attributes are influenced
by social, behavioral, and environmental factors.
A person's genetic diary, moreover, is highly complex,
with infinite possibilities of genetic influence. Ample evi-
dence exists that the results of genetic-based diagnosis and
prognosis are uncertain. The sensitivity of genetic testing
is limited by the known mutations in a target population.
For example, screening can detect only 75 percent of CF
chromosomes in the U.S. population. Approximately one
of every two couples from the general population identi-
fied by CF screening as "at-risk" will be falsely labeled.34
Predicting the nature, severity, and course of disease based
on a genetic marker is an additional difficulty. For most
genetic diseases, the onset date, severity of symptoms, and
efficacy of treatment and management vary greatly.
Nonetheless, the force of genomic information, even
if exaggerated, is powerful. Genomic information is highly
beneficial for health care decisions regarding prevention,
treatment, diet, lifestyle, and reproductive choices. In par-
ticular, collection of genomic data can provide the follow-
ing benefits to individuals and to society.
Enhanced patient choice. Genetic testing can enhance
autonomous decision making by providing patients with
better information. Genomic data, for example, can pro-
vide information about carrier states, enabling couples to
make more informed reproductive choices; about disabili-
ties of the fetus, guiding decisions about abortion or fetal
treatment; about markers for future disease, informing
lifestyle decisions; and about current health status, provid-
ing greater options for early treatment. Some may not agree
that genetic information used for these purposes is inher-
ently good, for the information could be used to increase
selective abortion to "prevent" the births of babies with
genetic disabilities.
Clinical benefit. Often a disconnection exists between
the ability of science to detect disease and its ability to
prevent, treat, or cure it. Scientific achievement in identi-
fying genetic causes of disease must be tempered by a hard
look at scientifically possible methods of intervention. As
discussed below, if the possible stigma or discrimination
associated with the disease is great, and science remains
powerless to prevent or treat it, the potential benefits may
outweigh harms. Despite this caveat, the Human Genome
Initiative holds the current or potential ability to achieve a
great deal of good for patients.
Couples can decide to change their plans for repro-
duction based on information disclosed in genetic counsel-
ing, thus reducing the chance of a child born with disease.
Detection of metabolic abnormalities can empower a per-
son to control their diet and lifestyle to prevent the onset
of symptomatology. Identification of enhanced risk for
multifactorial diseases, such as certain cancers or mental
illness, could help people avoid exposure to particular oc-
cupational or environmental toxins or stresses." Finally,
medicine is increasing its ability to treat genetic conditions.
Wivel and Walters discuss several categories of human ge-
netic intervention: somatic cell gene therapy involving cor-
rection of genetic defects in any human cells except germ
or reproductive cells; germ-line modification involving cor-
rection or prevention of genetic deficiencies through the
transfer of properly functioning genes into reproductive
cells; and use of somatic and/or germ-line modifications to
effect selected physical and mental characteristics, with the
aim of influencing such features as physical appearance or
physical abilities (in the patient or in succeeding genera-
tions).36 While use of germ-line therapy, particularly when
designed to enhance human capability, is highly charged,
most people agree that the ability to prevent and treat ge-
netic disease offers patients a chance for health and well-
being that would not be possible absent genetic interven-
tion. Clinical applications of genetic technologies are also
possible in other areas; for example, scientists have reported
progress in transplanting animal organs into humans. In-
sertion of human genes into animals could render their
organs more suitable for transplantation into humans with-
out substantial tissue rejection.37
Improved research. Despite substantial progress in the
Human Genome Initiative, a great deal more must be un-
derstood about the detection, prevention, and treatment
of genetic disease. Genetic research holds the potential for
improving diagnosis, counseling, and treatment for per-
sons with genetic conditions or traits. Research can help
determine the frequency and distribution of genetic traits
in various populations, the interconnections between geno-
types and phenotypes, and the safety and efficacy of vari-
ous genetic interventions.
Genetic data bases, containing DNA and/or stored tis-
sue, could make this kind of research less expensive by
reducing the costs of collecting and analyzing data, more
trustworthy by increasing the accuracy of the data, and
more generalizable to segments of the population by assur-
ing the completeness of the data.
Protection of public health. While traditional genetic
diagnosis, treatment, and research is oriented toward the
individual patient, genetic applications can also benefit the
public health. There is considerable utility in using popu-
lation-based data to promote community health. Genomic
data can help track the incidence, patterns, and trends of
genetic carrier states or disease in populations. Carefully
planned surveillance or epidemiological activities facilitate
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rapid identification of health needs. This permits repro-
ductive counseling, testing, health education, and treatment
resources to be better targeted, and points the way for fu-
ture research. For example, recent epidemiological research
of DNA samples from Eastern European Jewish women
found that nearly 1 percent contained a specific gene mu-
tation that may predispose them to breast and ovarian can-
cer. This finding offered the first evidence from a large
study that an alteration in the gene, BRCA1, is present at
measurable levels not only in families at high risk for dis-
ease, but also in a specific group of the general popula-
tion.3" Certainly, evidence of enhanced risk of disease in
certain populations, such as sickle cell in African Ameri-
cans or Tay-Sachs in Ashkenazi Jews, may foster discrimi-
nation against these groups. At the same time, population-
based genetic findings support other clinical studies to evalu-
ate the risk to populations bearing the mutation or to de-
termine whether BRCA1 testing should be offered to par-
ticular ethnic groups as part of their routine health care.
Privacy implications of genomic data
The vision of a comprehensive genetic information system
described above is technologically feasible, and a well-func-
tioning system would likely achieve significant benefits for
individuals, families, and populations. However, to decide
whether to continue to accumulate vast amounts of ge-
nomic information, it is necessary to measure the probable
effects on the privacy of these groups. The diminution in
privacy entailed in genetic information systems depends
on the sensitive nature of the data, as well as on the safe-
guards against unauthorized disclosure of the information.
Genomic data and harms of disclosure
Privacy is not simply the almost inexhaustible opportuni-
ties for access to data; it is also the intimate nature of those
data and the potential harm to persons whose privacy is
violated.39 Health records contain much information with
multiple uses: demographic information; financial infor-
mation; information about disabilities, special needs, and
other eligibility criteria for government benefits; and
medical information. This information is frequently suffi-
cient to provide a detailed profile of the individual and
that person's family. Traditional medical records, more-
over, are only a subset of records containing personal in-
formation held by social services, immigration, and law
enforcement.
Genomic data can personally identify an individual
and his/her parents, siblings, and children, and provide a
current and future health profile with far more scientific
accuracy than other health data. The features of a person
revealed by genetic information are fixed-unchanging and
unchangeable. Although some genomic data contain infor-
mation that is presently indecipherable, they may be un-
locked by new scientific understanding; but such discover-
ies could raise questions about improper usage of stored
DNA samples.40 Finally, societies have previously sought
to control the gene pool through eugenics. This practice is
particularly worrisome because different genetic charac-
teristics occur with different frequencies in racial and eth-
nic populations.
The combination of emerging computer and genetic
technologies poses particularly compelling privacy con-
cerns. Scientists have the capacity to store a million DNA
fragments on one silicon microchip. 41 While this technol-
ogy can markedly facilitate research, screening, and treat-
ment of genetic conditions, it may also permit a significant
reduction in privacy through its capacity to store and deci-
pher unimaginable quantities of highly sensitive data.
A variety of underlying harms to patients may result
from unwanted disclosures of these sensitive genomic data.
A breach of privacy can result in economic harms, such as
loss of employment, insurance, or housing. It can also
result in social or psychological harms. Disclosure of some
conditions can be stigmatizing, and can cause embarrass-
ment, social isolation, and a loss of self-esteem. These risks
are especially great when the perceived causes of the health
condition include drug or alcohol dependency, mental ill-
ness, mental retardation, obesity, or other genetically linked
conditions revealed by a person's DNA. Even though ge-
nomic information can be unreliable or extraordinarily
complicated to decipher, particularly with multifactorial
disease or other complicated personal characteristics (for
instance, intelligence), public perceptions attribute great
weight to genetic findings and simply aggravate the poten-
tial stigma and discrimination.
Maintaining reasonable levels of privacy is essential to
the effective functioning of the health and public health
systems. Patients are less likely to divulge sensitive informa-
tion to health professionals, such as family histories, if they
are not assured that their confidences will be respected.
The consequence of incomplete information is that patients
may not receive adequate diagnosis and treatment. Persons
at risk of genetic disease may not come forward for the
testing, counseling, or treatment. Informational privacy,
therefore, not only protects patients' social and economic
interests, but also their health and the health of their fami-
lies and discrete populations.
Legal protection of genetic privacy and security
of health information
One method of affording some measure of privacy protec-
tion is to furnish rigorous legal safeguards. Current legal
safeguards are inadequate, fragmented, and inconsistent,
and contain major gaps in coverage. Significant theoretical
problems also exist.
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Constitutional right to privacy
A considerable literature has emerged on the existence and
extent of a constitutional right to informational privacy
independent of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on un-
reasonable searches and seizures.42 To some, judicial recog-
nition of a constitutional right to informational privacy is
particularly important because the government is an im-
portant collector and disseminator of information. Citi-
zens, it is argued, should not have to rely on government
to protect their privacy interests. Rather, individuals need
protection from government itself, and an effective consti-
tutional remedy is the surest method to prevent unautho-
rized government acquisition or disclosure of personal in-
formation. The problem with this approach is that the
Constitution does not expressly provide a right to privacy,
and the Supreme Court has curtailed constitutional pro-
tection both for decisional and informational privacy.43
Notwithstanding the Court's current retreat, a body
of case law does suggest judicial recognition of a limited
right to informational privacy as a liberty interest within
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
In Whalen v. Roe,44 the Supreme Court squarely faced the
question of whether the constitutional right to privacy en-
compasses the collection, storage, and dissemination of
health information in government data banks. In dicta, the
Court acknowledged "the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government
files." 45 However, the Court hardly crafted an adequate
constitutional remedy to meet this threat. Justice Stevens,
writing for a unanimous court, simply recognized that "in
some circumstances" the duty to avoid unwarranted dis-
closures "arguably has its roots in the Constitution. '46 The
Court found no violation in Whalen because the state had
adequate standards and procedures for protecting the pri-
vacy of sensitive medical information. Rather, it suggested
deferentially that supervision of public health and other
important government activities "require [s] the orderly pres-
ervation of great quantities of information, much of which
is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or
harmful if disclosed. '47
Most lower courts have read Whalen as affording a
circumscribed right to informational privacy, or have
grounded the right on state constitutional provisions.41
Courts have employed a flexible test balancing the govern-
ment invasion of privacy and the strength of the govern-
ment interest. For example, the Third Circuit in United
States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.49 enunciated five fac-
tors to be balanced in determining the scope of the consti-
tutional right to informational privacy: (1) the type of record
and the information it contains; (2) the potential for harm
in any unauthorized disclosure; (3) the injury from disclo-
sure to the relationship in which the record was generated;
(4) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent nonconsensual
disclosure; and (5) the degree of need for access-that is, a
recognizable public interest.
Judicial deference to government's expressed need to
acquire and use information is an unmistakable theme in
the case law. Provided that government articulates a valid
societal purpose and employs reasonable security measures,
courts have not interfered with traditional governmental
activities of information collection. Unmistakably, govern-
ment could enunciate a powerful societal purpose in the
collection of genomic information such as public health or
law enforcement.
The right to privacy under the Constitution is, of
course, limited to state action. As long as the federal or a
state government itself collects information or requires other
entities to collect it, state action will not be a central ob-
stacle. However, collection and use of genomic data by
private or quasi-private health data organizations, health
plans, researchers, and insurers remains unprotected by the
Constitution, particularly in light of an absence of govern-
ment regulation of genetic data banking.
Legislating health information privacy:
theoretical concerns
Legislatures and agencies have designed a number of stat-
utes and regulations to protect privacy. A full description
and analysis of the legislation and regulation is undertaken
elsewhere.5 0 The Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices described this body of legislation as "a morass of er-
ratic law.""1 The law is fragmented, highly variable, and, at
times, weak; the legislation treats some kinds of data as
super-confidential, while providing virtually no protection
for other kinds.
Health data are frequently protected as part of the phy-
sician-patient relationship. However, data collected in our
information age is based only in small part on this rela-
tionship. Many therapeutic encounters in a managed care
context are not with a primary care physician. Patients may
see various nonphysician health professionals. Focusing
legal protection on a single therapeutic relationship within
this information environment is an anachronistic vestige
of an earlier and simpler time in medicine. Moreover, the
health record, as I pointed out, contains a substantial
amount of information gathered from numerous primary
and secondary sources. Patients' health records not only are
kept in the office of a private physician or of a health plan,
but also are kept by government agencies, regional health
data base organizations, or information brokers. Data bases
maintained in each of these settings will be collected and
transmitted electronically, reconfigured, and linked.
Rules enforcing informational privacy in health care
place a duty on the entity that possesses the information.
Thus, the keeper of the record-whether a private physi-
cian's office, a hospital, or a hospital maintenance organi-
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zation-holds the primary duty to maintain the confiden-
tiality of the data. The development of electronic health
care networks permitting standardized patient-based infor-
mation to flow nationwide, and perhaps worldwide, means
that the current privacy protection system, which focuses
on requiring the institution to protect its records, needs to
be reconsidered. Our past thinking assumed a paper or
automated record created and protected by the provider.
We must now envision a patient-based record that anyone
in the system can call up on a screen. Because location has
less meaning in an electronic world, protecting privacy re-
quires attaching protection to the health record itself, rather
than to the institution that generates it.
Genetic privacy legislation
A genetic-specific privacy statute has been introduced in
Congress.12 Several states have adopted genetic-specific
privacy laws, 3 and others have bills pending.5 4 Eight states
have provisions that prohibit obtaining and/or disclosing
genomic information about individuals without their in-
formed consent; one of these is limited to information about
sickle cell testing.5 These genetic privacy statutes are highly
variable. While a few, such as California's Hereditary Dis-
orders Act, provide privacy protection across a broad range
of genomic information, most statutes have limited appli-
cation. For example, privacy statutes in Maine, Massachu-
setts, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, and Virginia are appli-
cable principally to genetic screening programs conducted
by or under the auspices of the state health department.
They may leave the private sector virtually unregulated in
its collection and use of genomic data. Other states, like
Florida, have strong, generally applicable, provisions giving
persons "exclusive property" rights over genomic infor-
mation, but specify broad exemptions for data collected
for criminal prosecutions and determinations of paternity.
Additional statutes protect the confidentiality of ge-
nomic information, but do so with narrow purpose. Sev-
eral states regulate the use of genomic data collected for
insurance underwriting s6 or determinations of parentage.5 7
Among the eight states that proscribe genetic discrimina-
tion in insurance, most simply require actuarial fairness
and a few require confidentiality; the actuarial provisions
have the effect of promoting accuracy, but little more. In
Nevada, the genetic privacy statute applies only to the state
university system.5
The adoption of a genetic-specific privacy statute at
the federal or state level has been proposed .5 A recently
drafted model federal act incorporates traditional fair in-
formation practices into the collection and use of genomic
data. 0 Under this model act, a person who collects human
tissue for the purposes of genetic analysis must provide
specific information and a notice of rights prior to collec-
tion; obtain written authorization; restrict access to DNA
samples; and abide by a sample source's instructions re-
garding the maintenance and destruction of DNA samples.
Existing and proposed genetic-specific privacy statutes
are founded on the premise that genetic information is suf-
ficiently different from other health information to justify
special treatment. Certainly, genomic data present com-
pelling justifications for privacy protection: the sheer breath
of information discoverable; the potential to unlock se-
crets that are currently unknown about the person; the
unique quality of the information enabling certain identifi-
cation of the individual; the stability of DNA rendering
distant future applications possible; and the generalizabil-
ity of the data to families, genetically related communities,
and ethnic and racial populations.
It must also be observed that genetic-specific privacy
statutes could create inconsistencies in the rules governing
dissemination of health information. Under genetic-spe-
cific privacy statutes, different standards would apply to
data held by the same entity, depending on whether ge-
netic analysis had been used. The creation of strict genetic-
specific standards may significantly restrain the dissemina-
tion of genornic data (even to the point of undermining
legitimate health goals), while nongenomic data receive
insufficient protection. Arguments that genomic data de-
serve special protection must reckon with the fact that other
health conditions raise similar sensitivity issues (for ex-
amples, HIV infection, tuberculosis, STDs, and mental ill-
nesses). Indeed, carving out special legal protection for sen-
sitive data may be regarded as inherently faulty, because
the desired scope of privacy encompassing a health condi-
tion varies from individual to individual. Some patients
may be just as sensitive about prevalent nongenetic or
multifactorial diseases like cancer and heart disease as they
are about diseases with a unique genetic component. Even
if it could be argued that most diseases will one day be
found to be, at least in part, genetically caused, this will
still raise questions about why purely viral or bacterial dis-
eases should receive less, or different, protection.
Finally, adoption of different privacy and security rules
for genomic data could pose practical problems in our health
information infrastructure. The flow of medical informa-
tion is rarely restricted to particular diseases or conditions.
Transmission of electronic data for purposes of medical
consultation, research, or public health is seldom limited
to one kind of information. Requiring hospitals, research
institutions, health departments, insurers, and others to
maintain separate privacy and security standards (and per-
haps separate record systems) for genomic data may not be
wise or practical. A more thoughtful solution would be to
adopt a comprehensive federal statute on health informa-
tion privacy, with explicit language applying privacy and
security standards to genomic information. If genomic data
were insufficiently protected by these legal standards, ad-
ditional safeguards could be enacted.
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Uniform standards for acquisition and disclosure
of health information
I previously proposed uniform national standards for the
acquisition and disclosure of health information.61 Below,
I briefly describe those standards and outline how they
would apply equally to genomic data.62
Substantive and procedural review. Many see the col-
lection of health data as an inherent good. Even if the so-
cial good to be achieved is not immediately apparent, it is
always possible that some future benefit could accrue. But
despite optimism in the power of future technology, the
diminution in privacy attributable to the collection of health
data demands that the acquisition of information serve some
substantial interest. The burden rests on the collector of
information not merely to assert a substantial public inter-
est, but also to demonstrate that it would be achieved. In-
formation should only be collected under the following
conditions: (1) the need for the information is substantial;
(2) the collection of the data would actually achieve the
objective; (3) the purpose could not be achieved without
the collection of identifiable information; and (4) the data
would be held only for a period necessary to meet the valid
objectives. Thus, collectors of genomic information would
have to justify the collection and to use of the information,
and they would have to show why collection of tissue or
DNA is necessary to achieve the purpose.
The collection of large amounts of health informa-
tion, such as a tissue or a DNA repository, not only re-
quires a substantive justification, but also warrants proce-
dural review. Decisions to create health data bases, whether
by government or private sector, ought to require proce-
dural review. Some mechanism for independent review by
a dispassionate expert body would provide a forum for
examination of the justification for the data collection, the
existence of thoughtful consent procedures, and the main-
tenance of adequate privacy and security.
Autonomy to control personal data. If a central ethical
value behind privacy is respect for personal autonomy, then
individuals from whom data are collected must be afforded
the right to know about and to approve the uses of those
data. Traditional informed consent requires that a compe-
tent person have adequate information to make a genu-
inely informed choice. However, few objective standards
have been developed to measure the adequacy of consent.
To render consent meaningful, the process must incorpo-
rate clear content areas:63 how privacy and security will be
maintained; the person's right of ownership of, and con-
trol over, the data; specific instructions on means of ac-
cess, review, and correction of records; the length of time
that the information will be stored and the circumstances
when it would be expunged; authorized third-party access
to the data; and future secondary uses. If secondary uses of
those data go beyond the scope of the original consent (for
example, use of human tissue to create cell lines or disclo-
sure to employers or insurers) additional consent must be
sought.
Right to review and correct personal data. A central
tenet of fair information practices is that individuals have
the right to review data about themselves and to correct or
amend inaccurate or incomplete records. This right respects
a person's autonomy, while assuring the integrity of data.
Individuals cannot meaningfully control the use of personal
data unless they are fully aware of their contents and can
assess the integrity of the information. Individuals can also
help determine if the record is accurate and complete.
Health data can only achieve essential societal purposes if
they are correct and reasonably comprehensive. One
method, therefore, of ensuring the reliability of health
records is to prQvide a full and fair procedure to challenge
the accuracy of records and to make corrections. Thus,
persons must be fully aware of the tissue and genetic mate-
rial that is collected and stored. Moreover, they must be
fully informed about the content and meaning of any ge-
netic analysis-past, current, or future. For instance, if an
individual consents to the collection of tissue for epide-
miological research on breast cancer, he/she would be en-
titled to see and correct any information derived from that
tissue. If, in the future, the tissue were used to predict,
say, dementia in the patient, he/she would have to consent
and would also have the right to see and correct any new
information derived from that particular genetic analysis.
Use of data for intended purposes. Entities that possess
information have obligations that go beyond their own
needs and interests. In some sense, they hold the informa-
tion on behalf of the individual and, more generally, for
the benefit of all patients in the health system. A confi-
dence is reposed in a professional who possesses personal
information for the benefit of others. They have an obliga-
tion to use health information only for limited purposes;
to disclose information only for purposes for which the
data were obtained; to curtail disclosure to the minimum
necessary to accomplish the purpose; and to maintain an
accounting of any disclosure.
The idea of seeing holders of information as trustees
has special force with genomic data. Because DNA might
unlock the most intimate secrets of human beings and holds
the potential for unethical uses, those who possess it must
meet the highest ethical standards.
Conclusion
The human genome retains enormous appeal in the United
States. Americans, enamored with the power of science,
often turn to genetic technology for easy answers to per-
plexing medical and social questions. This exaggerated
perception is problematic. Genomic information can wield
considerable influence, affecting the decisions of health care
professionals, patients and their families, employers, in-
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surers, and the justice system. How does society control
this information without stifling the real potential for hu-
man good that it offers? The answer to this question must
be in recognizing that trade-offs are inevitable. Permitting
the Human Genome Initiative to proceed unabated will
have costs in personal privacy. While careful security safe-
guards will not provide complete privacy, the public should
be assured that genomic information will be treated in an
orderly and respectful manner and that individual claims
of control over those data will be adjudicated fairly.
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